Friday, October 14, 2016

The Yemeni Civil War and the Consequences of American Involvement


Yesterday, the United States Navy vessel Nitze launched a series of cruise missile attacks on radar sites in Southern Yemen in response to reported attacks on American ships in the area. The attack underscores American involvement in Yemen, an immensely complex and historically under-reported conflict area. Unfortunately, American action in Yemen is likely to only increase extremist activity in the area, leading to a weaker Yemeni state and a greater chance of incubation for non-state armed groups and their affiliates. So why is America involved at all? And what is the conflict in Yemen really about?


The origin of the current war in Yemen extends far into history, but its most notable roots can be found in the Arab Spring and subsequent Yemeni revolution of 2011. In short, the overthrow of the Tunisian government in the Arab Spring inspired the people of Yemen to demand that the Yemeni government under President Ali Abdullah Saleh cease its oppressive and corrupt practices. After little change was made in response to these demands, protesters gradually began to call for Saleh's resignation, which he refused. As tensions rose, tribal leaders (Sheikhs) and politicians attempted to quell the unrest and find a middle ground. But, after a series of government responses to peaceful protests turned bloody, tribal leaders distanced themselves from Saleh's government and began to gather support for rural insurgency and revolution. Saleh declared them criminals. This was a very, very bad idea- much of Middle Eastern society is based on traditional tribal cultural values and organizational structures. These tribes are the bedrock of political and social power. Middle Eastern people are historically less interested in a centralized form of government, and prefers the smaller unit form of tribal governance. Because of this, tribal leaders often wield immense political, religious, financial, and military power. So, for Saleh to declare the tribal leaders and their tribesmen as criminals was a foolish decision, and it further alienated the Yemeni people from both his government and the idea of a major, centralized government. In the next few months, a brief but total revolution against the government swept over the land.

In response to this revolution, the Gulf Cooperation Council (a group of Sunni Muslim nations including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and UAE) intervened in 2012 in order to arrange terms for a ceasefire, Saleh's resignation, and the formation of a new Yemeni government. Revolutionary leadership agreed to the GCC terms, and Saleh's second in command was installed as President. Peace was, with one major exception, restored.

Unfortunately, the revolution also riled the sentiments of a significant and semi-radicalized group of Shiites known as Ansar Allah. Unofficially referred to as the Houthis, Ansar Allah is a conglomeration of Zaidi Shia tribal elements from Northern Yemen who have fought against the perceived oppressions of the Yemeni government since 1994. Although they accepted a brief cease-fire in 2010, they became a significant fighting force in the 2011 revolution, and were largely responsible for Saleh’s exile. 

The Houthis are a Shia Islamic movement. The former Saleh government (along with the GCC and much of the Middle East) was Sunni Muslim. Yemen itself is divided between 60% Sunni and 40% Shia Muslims, split largely between urban and rural citizens, respectively. For those who are unaware, Shia and Sunni Muslims have long been at odds as to the legitimate bloodline of the holy prophet Mohammad. This difference in opinion has caused untold suffering and bloodshed in the Middle East. Each sect has its own characteristics and sets of beliefs, and numerous sub-sects to follow. 

One notable characteristic of Shia Muslim doctrine is an awareness and watchfulness for the corruption of government and undue influence of foreign bodies upon domestic entities. Consequently, the Houthis themselves were strongly against the perceived corruption of the Saleh government and the GCC’s involvement in Yemen: while other Yemeni tribes accepted the GCC's terms for the new government and power transfer, the Houthis saw the agreement as an excuse for Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations to assert authority within Yemen- they labeled the new government a proxy sham and an affront to Yemeni governance. The Houthis have also been outspoken in their distaste for foreign involvement in Yemeni affairs from other sources, such as the United States and Israel governments. They have even gone so far as to include “Death to America; death to Israel; curse the Jews” in their official slogan. While a spokesman for the Houthis claimed that these statements merely reflected a hatred for American and Israeli governments and not their peoples, there have been many reports of abuse and harassment of Yemeni Jews at the hands of Houthi rebels. It is unclear if these reports are accurate- and it should be noted that there are many reports of the Houthis actively attempting to provide safety, education, infrastructure, and political opportunity for the Yemeni people. Ambassador Matthew Tueller, chief US ambassador in Yemen, claims that the stories of abuse at the hands of Houthi rebels are unlikely to be accurate. The slogan, however, indicates otherwise.
Either way, the Houthis response to the involvement of the GCC (and by extension the United States and Israel) was swift and aggressive. They refused to recognize the new government and launched a more expansive insurgency against the new, GCC-supported government. 

In 2014, Ansar Allah successfully overthrew the government and took control of Sana’a. Upon seizing the capitol, they created an interim body for governing Yemen known as the Supreme Revolutionary Committee. Forming the committee allowed the Houthis to centralize power in a seemingly legitimate political structure based on Yemeni tribal principles that would appeal to a broad number of Yemeni. Consequently, the Houthis (only 20,000-30,000 strong) were able to unite with elements of the former government in order to form a strong military force of over 200,000. These forces were further augmented by financial and military support from the Iranian government- a Shia nation interested in supporting other Shia governments in the Middle East.

In response to these developments, the GCC launched a military intervention in Yemen, ostensibly to protect Sunni Muslims from the Shia Houthi’s assault. Over 10,000 Saudi troops are now confirmed to be in the warzone, along with over 100 warplanes and numerous paramilitary contractors. While their size does not match that of the Revolutionaries, they enjoy the assistance of Western nations such as the United States and Israel. The GCC has also launched an effective naval and air blockade. But, even so, the campaign has not gone well. The Houthis have become an impressive and well-organized non-state group, with sophisticated command and control structures and support from many Yemen citizens, both Shia and Sunni. After years of insurgency and their partnership with conventional military forces, their tactical approach has evolved to an extremely effective degree, and they have been able to capture much of habitable Yemen (a significant portion of which is covered by desert). The conflict is ongoing, and is proving as complex as Syria’s civil war.

So, in summary: there are multiple state powers converging to fight over the fate of the Yemeni people and government. The Houthis, Saleh supporters, and other Shia tribal elements are all fighting (with the support of Iran) to ostensibly liberate the Yemeni people from the undue influence of Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the forces of the GCC (including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman) are attempting to maintain Sunni influence in the Yemen and eliminate the threat of the Revolutionary forces. The GCC has the financial support of the United States, who provides intelligence, critical military resources, and infrastructure. 

The United States itself is likely supporting the GCC in order to aid its strongest Middle Eastern ally, Saudi Arabia. But the United States has other reasons for wanting to support the GCC in Yemen. For starters, Iran's support of the Houthis worries the administration- if the Houthis were to unite Yemen in a stable nation state allied with Iran, it could give Iran greater influence over much of the Arabian Peninsula and Sea, increasing the complexity of a number of America's key strategic goals in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.  There are also many within the government who are concerned of a Houthi government becoming a safe-haven to anti-American and anti-Israeli radicalized Shia organizations. Obviously, this is not a situation that the United States has any interest in- one more anti-American Muslim nation would do nothing but create difficult situations in the Middle East. Furthermore, due to Ansar Allah’s history as an uncompromising insurgency, its volatile rhetoric, and its close ties to Iran (which is itself perceived by the West to be a semi-radicalized Shia nation), some experts feel that the organization may develop into a violent extremist armed group in the near future. At the very least, a nation-state founded upon the ideals that the Houthi organization espouses may not be a stable force in the Middle East. In order to avoid any of these situations, United States policy makers feel as though it is best to simply avoid a Houthi state by supporting the Saudi-led GCC. 

But the United States is also interested in Yemen because of the Al Qaeda and Daesh (both Sunni non-state armed groups) forces that have executed attacks there against the Shia Houthi rebels. Pundits of U.S. involvement in Yemen claim that, in order to halt the spread of these organizations, America must maintain a presence in the nation. Indeed, for years, the United States has still devoted considerable resources to eliminating these extremist elements within Yemen using drone-based airstrikes and naval-based cruise missile attacks.  But, this argument ignores the fact that these terrorist forces appear to have gained little support from the people of Yemen. Indeed, numerous sources report that the ISIS and Al Qaeda movements in Yemen have largely failed to generate any kind of sympathy. This most likely due to the Yemeni people's aversion to authority- there is little reason for the people of Yemen to ascribe to a "caliphate" in Syria or Iraq when they scarcely support any form of centralized government in their own nation.

The other reasons for United States interference in Yemen are just as unconvincing, if not downright dangerous: America is also playing an incredibly dangerous and delicate game. The GCC does not seem to have a plan for bringing a stable government to Yemen- even if they proved victorious in Yemen, they would still have a violent Shia insurgency on their hands prepared to fight passionately against Sunnis. There is no outcome in which the GCC’s actions create a stable state. Consequently, America’s contribution is only feeding the flames, and threatening to make matters far worse. If Washington lends too much or the wrong type of aid to the GCC, they risk further antagonizing Yemen’s citizens and turning yet another Middle Eastern people against them. Moreover, if America continues to contribute to the systematic erosion of the semi-radicalized Houthi organization, it could end up contributing to its full-radicalization—or worse yet, weaken it to the point where Yemen becomes an incubator for violent non-state groups such as anti-American terrorists. Either way, America loses. The best course of action would be for the United States to withdraw from the conflict altogether. They could then attempt to facilitate negotiations between the Saudis and Yemeni tribal leaders to move for a stable Yemeni state and hope for the best. Negotiating with the tribal leaders, which would speak to a wide portion of Yemen’s demographics, would also have the added benefits of showing respect to Yemen’s fundamental social structures and bypassing the complex Houthi nation altogether.



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