Yesterday, the United States Navy
vessel Nitze launched a series of cruise missile attacks on radar sites
in Southern Yemen in response to reported attacks on American ships in the
area. The attack underscores American involvement in Yemen, an immensely
complex and historically under-reported conflict area. Unfortunately, American
action in Yemen is likely to only increase extremist activity in the area,
leading to a weaker Yemeni state and a greater chance of incubation for non-state
armed groups and their affiliates. So why is America involved at all? And what
is the conflict in Yemen really about?
The origin of the current war in
Yemen extends far into history, but its most notable roots can be found in the
Arab Spring and subsequent Yemeni revolution of 2011. In short, the overthrow
of the Tunisian government in the Arab Spring inspired the people of Yemen to
demand that the Yemeni government under President Ali Abdullah Saleh cease its oppressive
and corrupt practices. After little change was made in response to these
demands, protesters gradually began to call for Saleh's resignation, which he
refused. As tensions rose, tribal leaders (Sheikhs) and politicians attempted
to quell the unrest and find a middle ground. But, after a series of government
responses to peaceful protests turned bloody, tribal leaders distanced
themselves from Saleh's government and began to gather support for rural
insurgency and revolution. Saleh declared them criminals. This was a very, very
bad idea- much of Middle Eastern society is based on traditional tribal
cultural values and organizational structures. These tribes are the bedrock of political
and social power. Middle Eastern people are historically less interested in a
centralized form of government, and prefers the smaller unit form of tribal
governance. Because of this, tribal leaders often wield immense political,
religious, financial, and military power. So, for Saleh to declare the tribal
leaders and their tribesmen as criminals was a foolish decision, and it further
alienated the Yemeni people from both his government and the idea of a major,
centralized government. In the next few months, a brief but total revolution
against the government swept over the land.
In response to this revolution, the
Gulf Cooperation Council (a group of Sunni Muslim nations including Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, and UAE) intervened in 2012 in order to
arrange terms for a ceasefire, Saleh's resignation, and the formation of a new Yemeni
government. Revolutionary leadership agreed to the GCC terms, and Saleh's
second in command was installed as President. Peace was, with one major
exception, restored.
Unfortunately, the revolution also
riled the sentiments of a significant and semi-radicalized group of Shiites
known as Ansar Allah. Unofficially referred to as the Houthis, Ansar Allah is a
conglomeration of Zaidi Shia tribal elements from Northern Yemen who have
fought against the perceived oppressions of the Yemeni government since 1994.
Although they accepted a brief cease-fire in 2010, they became a significant
fighting force in the 2011 revolution, and were largely responsible for Saleh’s
exile.
The Houthis are a Shia Islamic
movement. The former Saleh government (along with the GCC and much of the Middle
East) was Sunni Muslim. Yemen itself is divided between 60% Sunni and 40% Shia
Muslims, split largely between urban and rural citizens, respectively. For
those who are unaware, Shia and Sunni Muslims have long been at odds as to the
legitimate bloodline of the holy prophet Mohammad. This difference in opinion
has caused untold suffering and bloodshed in the Middle East. Each sect has its
own characteristics and sets of beliefs, and numerous sub-sects to follow.
One notable characteristic of Shia
Muslim doctrine is an awareness and watchfulness for the corruption of government
and undue influence of foreign bodies upon domestic entities. Consequently, the
Houthis themselves were strongly against the perceived corruption of the Saleh
government and the GCC’s involvement in Yemen: while other Yemeni tribes
accepted the GCC's terms for the new government and power transfer, the Houthis
saw the agreement as an excuse for Saudi Arabia and other GCC nations to assert
authority within Yemen- they labeled the new government a proxy sham and an
affront to Yemeni governance. The Houthis have also been outspoken in their
distaste for foreign involvement in Yemeni affairs from other sources, such as
the United States and Israel governments. They have even gone so far as to
include “Death to America; death to Israel; curse the Jews” in their official slogan.
While a spokesman for the Houthis claimed that these statements merely
reflected a hatred for American and Israeli governments
and not their peoples, there have
been many reports of abuse and harassment of Yemeni Jews at the hands of Houthi
rebels. It is unclear if these reports are accurate- and it should be noted
that there are many reports of the Houthis actively attempting to provide
safety, education, infrastructure, and political opportunity for the Yemeni
people. Ambassador Matthew Tueller, chief US ambassador in Yemen, claims that
the stories of abuse at the hands of Houthi rebels are unlikely to be accurate.
The slogan, however, indicates otherwise.
Either way, the Houthis response to
the involvement of the GCC (and by extension the United States and Israel) was
swift and aggressive. They refused to recognize the new government and launched
a more expansive insurgency against the new, GCC-supported government.
In 2014, Ansar Allah successfully
overthrew the government and took control of Sana’a. Upon seizing the capitol, they
created an interim body for governing Yemen known as the Supreme Revolutionary
Committee. Forming the committee allowed the Houthis to centralize power in a
seemingly legitimate political structure based on Yemeni tribal principles that
would appeal to a broad number of Yemeni. Consequently, the Houthis (only
20,000-30,000 strong) were able to unite with elements of the former government
in order to form a strong military force of over 200,000. These forces were
further augmented by financial and military support from the Iranian government-
a Shia nation interested in supporting other Shia governments in the Middle
East.
In response to these developments,
the GCC launched a military intervention in Yemen, ostensibly to protect Sunni
Muslims from the Shia Houthi’s assault. Over 10,000 Saudi troops are now
confirmed to be in the warzone, along with over 100 warplanes and numerous
paramilitary contractors. While their size does not match that of the
Revolutionaries, they enjoy the assistance of Western nations such as the
United States and Israel. The GCC has also launched an effective naval and air
blockade. But, even so, the campaign has not gone well. The Houthis have become
an impressive and well-organized non-state group, with sophisticated command
and control structures and support from many Yemen citizens, both Shia and
Sunni. After years of insurgency and their partnership with conventional
military forces, their tactical approach has evolved to an extremely effective
degree, and they have been able to capture much of habitable Yemen (a significant
portion of which is covered by desert). The conflict is ongoing, and is
proving as complex as Syria’s civil war.
So, in summary: there are multiple
state powers converging to fight over the fate of the Yemeni people and government.
The Houthis, Saleh supporters, and other Shia tribal elements are all fighting
(with the support of Iran) to ostensibly liberate the Yemeni people from the
undue influence of Sunni nations such as Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the
forces of the GCC (including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, and
Oman) are attempting to maintain Sunni influence in the Yemen and eliminate the
threat of the Revolutionary forces. The GCC has the financial support of the
United States, who provides intelligence, critical military resources, and
infrastructure.
The United States itself is likely
supporting the GCC in order to aid its strongest Middle Eastern ally, Saudi
Arabia. But the United States has other reasons for wanting to support the GCC
in Yemen. For starters, Iran's support of the Houthis worries the
administration- if the Houthis were to unite Yemen in a stable nation state
allied with Iran, it could give Iran greater influence over much of the Arabian
Peninsula and Sea, increasing the complexity of a number of America's key
strategic goals in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. There are also
many within the government who are concerned of a Houthi government becoming a
safe-haven to anti-American and anti-Israeli radicalized Shia organizations.
Obviously, this is not a situation that the United States has any interest in-
one more anti-American Muslim nation would do nothing but create difficult
situations in the Middle East. Furthermore, due to Ansar Allah’s history as an
uncompromising insurgency, its volatile rhetoric, and its close ties to Iran
(which is itself perceived by the West to be a semi-radicalized Shia nation),
some experts feel that the organization may develop into a violent extremist
armed group in the near future. At the very least, a nation-state founded upon
the ideals that the Houthi organization espouses may not be a stable force in
the Middle East. In order to avoid any of these situations, United States
policy makers feel as though it is best to simply avoid a Houthi state by
supporting the Saudi-led GCC.
But the United States is also
interested in Yemen because of the Al Qaeda and Daesh (both Sunni non-state
armed groups) forces that have executed attacks there against the Shia Houthi
rebels. Pundits of U.S. involvement in Yemen claim that, in order to halt the
spread of these organizations, America must maintain a presence in the nation. Indeed,
for years, the United States has still devoted considerable resources to
eliminating these extremist elements within Yemen using drone-based airstrikes
and naval-based cruise missile attacks. But, this argument ignores the
fact that these terrorist forces appear to have gained little support from the
people of Yemen. Indeed, numerous sources report that the ISIS and Al Qaeda
movements in Yemen have largely failed to generate any kind of sympathy. This
most likely due to the Yemeni people's aversion to authority- there is little
reason for the people of Yemen to ascribe to a "caliphate" in Syria
or Iraq when they scarcely support any form of centralized government in their
own nation.
The other reasons for United States interference
in Yemen are just as unconvincing, if not downright dangerous: America is also
playing an incredibly dangerous and delicate game. The GCC does not seem to
have a plan for bringing a stable government to Yemen- even if they proved
victorious in Yemen, they would still have a violent Shia insurgency on their
hands prepared to fight passionately against Sunnis. There is no outcome in
which the GCC’s actions create a stable state. Consequently, America’s
contribution is only feeding the flames, and threatening to make matters far
worse. If Washington lends too much or the wrong type of aid to the GCC, they
risk further antagonizing Yemen’s citizens and turning yet another Middle
Eastern people against them. Moreover, if America continues to contribute to
the systematic erosion of the semi-radicalized Houthi organization, it could
end up contributing to its full-radicalization—or worse yet, weaken it to the
point where Yemen becomes an incubator for violent non-state groups such as
anti-American terrorists. Either way, America loses. The best course of action
would be for the United States to withdraw from the conflict altogether. They
could then attempt to facilitate negotiations between the Saudis and Yemeni
tribal leaders to move for a stable Yemeni state and hope for the best.
Negotiating with the tribal leaders, which would speak to a wide portion of
Yemen’s demographics, would also have the added benefits of showing respect to
Yemen’s fundamental social structures and bypassing the complex Houthi nation
altogether.
No comments:
Post a Comment