The Syrian Cease-Fire and Russia's Game of Incremental Escalation

One week ago, Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov agreed upon a bilateral cease-fire agreement for the Syrian civil war. When the cease-fire went into effect this past Monday, the pact marked the fifth such attempt (and the third made by Kerry and Lavrov) to attenuate the sanguinary conflict and push stability into a brutal war-zone.

While the attempts to quell the conflict (even temporarily) are perhaps admirable, it is evident that Moscow has no interest in resolution. After all, the Russians see any possible conclusion to the civil war as involving the abdication of the Al-Assad regime, in which they have invested heavily. But, the Russians also hope to continue the conflict in order to accomplish their strategic goals in the region. But what are these interests, and what do they mean for American foreign policy?

In a way, the current involvement in Syria has diplomatic shades of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan from 1979-1989, where the Russians attempted to seize control of the fracturing Afghani state in order to ostensibly prop up a floundering communist party. Obviously, the means in the two cases are quite different- in 1979, the Soviets invaded (under the guise of invitation) Afghanistan with a major military force; in Syria, Russia has merely provided the al-Assad regime with military, economic, and diplomatic support while claiming to be interested in ending the conflict with negotiations and shows of de-escalation. But, the goals of both operations were largely similar: in Afghanistan, the Soviets sought to either directly control or work with a well situated communist ally, and thereby spread the influence of communism throughout the broader Middle East and counter Arab, anti-communist "Nasserism"; today, the Russians hope to preserve power in Syria itself in order to assert influence throughout the Middle East, maintain Russian naval and air bases in Syria (the only Mediterranean military assets currently possessed by Russia), frustrate American goals in the Middle East, and build inroads into a more substantial relationship with Syria's chief ally and fellow Shia state, Iran. But, in order to accomplish the final two (if not all) of these goals, Russia must manage to continue the conflict in Syria.

The final goal listed above is by far the most salient and contingent upon conflict: since the West's instigation of severe economic sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion and annexation of Crimea, Russia has desperately sought to establish more substantial economic, commercial, and diplomatic links with both China and Iran- the two nations it sees as primary allies in the fight against American influence. But Iran is notoriously difficult to deal with, and has proven fickle when dealing with non-Muslim nations. In recent years, Russia has succeeded in making some diplomatic progress with Iran, but certainly not as much as they would like. Therefore, Moscow wisely chose to improve its relationship with Iran by supporting the Islamic Republic's most significant ally and fellow Shia nation-state, Syria. So far, such action has yielded tangible benefits in Russian-Iranian relations- 3 years into Russian support for al-Assad in 2014, the Russians and Iranians signed a $20 billion oil deal that allowed Moscow to avoid the brunt of brutal Western sanctions; in 2015, Iran began the formal process to join the EEU, the Russian-bloc equivalent of the EU; finally, just this August, Russian jets were granted permission to launch attacks on Syrian rebels and extremists from Iranian military bases. Of course, these actions indicate a significant level of military, economic, and legal coordination that demands even greater diplomatic cooperation behind the scenes. Should the conflict in Syria end, such cooperation would be far more difficult to sustain: Russia may lose their foothold in Syria altogether, or be unable to continue a direct show of support to Iranian interests. Either way, they would lose their diplomatic leverage with Iran. Moscow still hopes to see its relationship with Tehran burgeon into a legitimate alliance- and can therefore not allow for an end to the Syrian conflict.

Russia's hope to undermine American influence abroad also relies upon continuing the Syrian civil war. While the United States has sought to end al-Assad’s regime and eliminate ISIS sanctuaries in Syria, Russian has acted as a constant thorn in Washington's side: Russian forces have directly attacked American supported Syrian rebels and directed Syrians to harass American allies in Turkey and Israel, and its diplomats and military leaders have accused the Americans of subterfuge, intentional negligence, and uncooperative action in the nearby fight against ISIS. Just today, for example, the Russians and Syrians accused American coalition forces of bombing Syrian military forces, killing over 60 and wounding close to 100 of al-Assad's troops. Both Moscow and Aleppo have seized the opportunity to launch bold vituperations of the American military: Syria has directly accused the United States of supporting ISIS and its subsidiaries. Humiliation at the hands of Russian and Syrian authorities, as well as the seriousness of the incident itself, is likely to have serious political consequences in Washington and reduce America's international credibility.

But Russian and Syrian castigations, in response to both serious and invented American missteps, are merely symptoms of Moscow's larger strategy of incremental escalation. Russia hopes that this strategy will draw the United States into committing military forces into the conflict, thus further threatening Washington's influence abroad. Indeed, Russia's military engagement in Syria has not only tested American strategy in the region, but has done so by masterfully exploiting and challenging Washington's greatest weaknesses: popular resistance to the use of American military forces in international crises, and America's enormous aversion to military casualties. Because of these factors, Washington's original and continuing strategy in Syria is to support moderate Syrian rebels with money, weapons, and training. But Russia has made it far more difficult for the United States to accomplish its goals using this strategy- the U.S.-backed rebels are losing vast amounts of ground to Syrian and Russian forces, despite American back-end support. Unfortunately, any other strategy would demand the commitment of American or coalition forces to the region in active combat roles, thereby opening up American armed forces to casualties. This would be a political disaster for Washington, generating enormous antipathy among the American people and widespread resistance to US intervention in foreign states. Such resistance would, in turn, make future military action far more difficult for American leaders, and therefore reduce the international influence of the United States. It is likely that Russia longs for such an outcome- any decrease in American influence abroad merely opens the door for the rise of Russian significance on the international stage. Washington, of course, knows that military involvement in Syria would be a critical error- but it is difficult to see another alternative without abandoning its regional goals and abjuring its support for the rebels.. Therefore, Russia's current strategy forces America to either raise their own political and military stakes in Syria and imperil American influence, or risk forfeiting their regional goals.

One thing is certain: Russia stands to gain enormously from the continuation of the conflict in Syria. Moscow is currently using the war as an opportunity to maintain control in Aleppo, develop relations with Iran, and challenge American influence. History would show us that Russia frequently makes bold, mercurial geopolitical decisions and dares the world at large to do what is necessary to stop them. The only way to truly counter this geopolitical strategy is to call the bluff- but Syria is not the time to do it. Hopefully, Washington finds another way to deal with the Russian problem in Syria without playing into Moscow's hand.