The Mediterranean of the sixteenth
century was a difficult and dangerous place to do business. In 1453, the Turks
had captured Constantinople, effectively eliminating the last remnant of the 1200
year-old Roman-Byzantine Empire.[1] By
1520, their domain was enormous, and their borders threatened to expand each
year. Since 1545, Ottoman galleys had been raiding Christian territories,
pillaging towns, capturing merchant vessels, and threatening to dominate the Meditteranean
Sea. These raids were becoming a serious problem for many of the Christian
Mediterranean powers. Venice, being the closest of these to the Ottomans, had
the most trouble with the Turks. Reports of merchant vessels being attacked by
Muslim warships arrived in Venice almost every day, and sightings of Ottoman
fleets off the Venetian coast were no less frequent. Furthermore, it was widely
believed that these small groups of Ottoman ships were merely broken off from a
massive Ottoman fleet, which was lying in wait somewhere in the Mediterranean. This
belief was in fact correct, as Müezzinzåde Ali Pasha, the admiral of the
Ottoman fleet (Kapudan-i deryå), had
anchored his entire navy in the Mediterranean to raid and pillage Christian
coasts.[2]
But Venice was not the only major
Christian power having trouble with the Turks. Since 1535, Charles V, the Holy
Roman Emperor and ruler of Spain had been in intermittent conflicts with the
Ottomans. Charles was an aggressive ruler and a fiercely devout Catholic. As
such, he dubbed himself the champion and protector of all Christendom. His son Philip
II, who inherited the Spanish throne in 1556, carried on this tradition by
declaring war on all “heretic” non-Christians. Philip, who is widely regarded
as one of Spain’s greatest rulers, was a staunch opponent of the extremely
powerful Muslim Ottoman Empire of Turkey. Philip saw these powerful Muslims as
a tremendous threat to his expanding empire. From the time the Turks began to
raid in the Mediterranean, Spain’s trade lines, especially those stretching
into the eastern Mediterranean, were under an extraordinary strain. If one
desired to ship wine (an important Spanish export) from Barcelona to anywhere
in the eastern Mediterranean, the shipment would have to travel directly
through Ottoman controlled waters, and the ship would likely be attacked by
Turkish warships.[3]
Furthermore, should the Ottoman raids push into the eastern [?] part of
the Mediterranean, Spanish trade and communication routes to the Spanish colonies
in the New World would also be at risk. These routes were the lifeline of the colonies;
without them the settlements would have been hard pressed to survive. The colonies
were a source of vast wealth for Spain; the spices, grains, furs, precious
metals and gems helped to finance the Crown’s operations. As such, Spain could
not tolerate any threats toward the Americas. Unfortunately, Philip
was fully occupied dealing with Protestant revolutionaries (whom he considered heretics)
in the Netherlands. He was therefore unable to focus his full military
attention on the Ottomans.[4]
Following the Ottoman’s 1565 attack
on Malta, Pope Pius V attempted to create a coalition of nations and republics to
protect Christian assets and endeavors in the Mediterranean. However he needed Spanish
support, and while Philip recognized the importance of such an alliance, he
desperately needed money to continue his fight against the Dutch rebels. After
years of negotiating, Philip convinced the Pope to lend him money, in exchange
for Spain front-manning [?] the league.
Thus, in 1571, Spain, Venice, the Papal States, Tuscany, the Knights
Hospitaler, Genoa, Tuscany, Sicily and Naples all signed the Pope’s treaty creating
the Holy League.[5]
According to Paolo Paruta, the official historian of Venice in 1571, the
League’s primary goal was the defense of Christendom in the Mediterranean, and
to this end, their founding memorandum called for, “200 gallies, 100 ships,
50,000 foot, Italians, Spanish and Dutch; 4500 horse, with a suitable train of
Artillery and Ammunition.”[6]
Leading these forces was the “noble and gracious…”[7]
Don Juan of Austria, Philip’s own illegitimate half-brother. Don Juan was only
twenty-two years old, but he was a man, “who by his words and actions appeared
to be greatly desirous of glory; and excellent hopes were conceived of him…” [8] Although
this proved to be a brilliant decision on Philip’s part, placing
Don Juan in charge of the fleet was a risky move due to his relative inexperience
in warfare (he had only briefly fought against pirates plaguing the
Spanish-Atlantic coast).
In fact, the entire endeavor was an
extraordinary gamble for the nations of the Holy League; nearly all members had
committed every available warship. Had
they been defeated, Venice and Spain would be the only countries left capable
of mounting any meaningful defense against the Ottomans. Although Venice’s navy
was renowned for its naval prowess, if they had lost at Lepanto the tiny
remainder of their naval force would have been insignificant against the
gargantuan might of the Ottoman Empire. Most of Spain’s forces were mired down
in the revolt in the Netherlands: it would take months for them to mobilize for
war in the Mediterranean. Furthermore, Spain’s fleet was composed mainly of galleons,
large ships designed for sailing and fighting on the open ocean. If Spain had had
to battle with the Ottomans after Lepanto for the control of the Mediterranean,
these sailing ships with their poor maneuverability would have easily been defeated
by the more agile Ottoman galleys. Therefore, defeat at Lepanto would have left
the Christian nations essentially undefended. Historian Roger Crowley remarks,
“With defeat, and the absence of any defending fleet, would have come the rapid
loss of all the major islands of the sea – Malta, Crete, the Balearics—a
last-ditch defense of Venice, and then,
from these launch-pads, a push into the heart of Italy, to Rome itself…”[9] Indeed, the European powers of the 16th
century understood that a defeat at Lepanto could have meant an utterly
different cultural and political future for Europe. Renowned Mediterranean
historian Fernand Braudel, in his book The
Mediterranean, states that Lepanto terrified Christians because it had,
“…in one single action imperiled the only defense of Italy and Christendom…”[10]
The Christian nations were not only risking their galleys, but their people,
cities, and control of the Mediterranean itself.
On September 17th, the Holy
League’s fleet sailed out of Messina, seeking the enemy. While no official
document specifically stated this, the leaders of the Holy League’s navy were
given detailed instructions to engage the enemy immediately and to win a
decisive victory against the Ottomans. Christianity was spoiling
for a fight.[11]
Three weeks later, on October 7th,
Don Juan’s crow’s nest signaled that sails were on the horizon. The Christian
fleet had crossed the Ionian Sea to Greece and sailed down the coast into the
straits near the Greek city of Lepanto (modern day Naupactus.) Don Juan and his
commanders wasted no time in drawing their fleet into battle formation. Paruta
recalls, “And thus immediately…he caused the Standard to be hoysted up in his
Gally… and made the signe of Battel be give…” [12] Sails
were dropped, guns and cannon were loaded, and armor was donned as armored
priests walked the deck, receiving quick and easy mass-confessions.
On the other side of the battle
lines, the Ottomans must have felt confident in their victory. Not only did
they have more ships, they also had a significant advantage in manpower. While
the Holy League arrived at Lepanto with a vast 80,000 men, (50,000 soldiers
and 30,000 rowers) the Ottomans had over 100,000.[13] But
the Christians had four advantages, which would prove to be keys to their victory
at Lepanto.
Before sailing on the Ottoman navy,
the massive Christian fleet had assembled at Messina. There they had
double-checked their numbers, arms, and supplies. Among the 239 Christian ships
were two different types of Mediterranean war-galleys: potentinas and levantinas.
Both were 100-120 feet long, with two main masts holding their triangular
shaped lateen sails, eleven to thirty-six benches of rowers and between 3 and 5
cannon.[14] Although
the combined fleet had a significant amount of firepower, an individual
galley’s guns were not powerful enough to sink an enemy ship: instead, the
Christians’ main goal was the overwhelming of its crew through close-quarter
combat after boarding. The Turkish fleet was comprised entirely of levantinas (they
were cheaper, and the Ottoman economy at that time was far weaker than those of
the Christians) so the Christians cleverly designed their potentinas to be
significantly higher above the water than those of the levantinas, making them
much easier to defend. Boarding a potentina from a levantina was as dangerous as
climbing a ladder to attack a defended city wall in a siege. Paolo Paruta’s
account of the battle reports that when the Ottomans, “…came to grappling…”
onto Christian ships “wherein many of our Gallies, boorded by the Enemy, though
upon disadvantage…” were able “…to resist a great number…”[15]
It was also relatively simple for a Holy League soldier to board a
Turkish vessel, as he simply had to jump over his ship’s railing. The potentina
was the most common kind of galley in the Holy League’s fleet, and their high
decks gave the Christians a significant advantage over the Ottoman galleys.
The Christians had another
advantage in naval construction: the Venetian galleass, the most powerful
warship in the Christian fleet. Each galleass sported close to 40 cannon, making them the most deadly naval
instrument in the Mediterranean. Even with three masts and twenty- seven
benches of free rowers, galleasses moved extremely slowly through the water due
to the weight of their guns. They moved so slowly, in fact, that several
smaller galleys had to tow them, as otherwise they could not have kept pace
with the fleet in open water.[16] Niccolo
Capponi, in his book Victory of the West,
discussed the strengths of the galleasses’ cannon and deck heights. “Whatever
its ordinance, a galleass was able to deliver a devastating artillery barrage
from all sides, and in addition its height made it impervious to boarding.” [17] Fleuri
Preuost, a French observer who was at Lepanto, took this argument one step
further. In a letter he sent in 1571 to the French king, Charles IX, he claimed
that the galleasses put the Ottoman fleet, “in greate disarray with their
artillerie…” and that the galleasses actions were “the onely and chiefe cause
of the victorie [at Lepanto].”[18] These
ships, with their powerful artillery, were a second advantage the Christians
had.
While the Turks
were going to be torn asunder by the galleasses, they would also be under a
hail of fire from the Christian infantry. All soldiers of the Holy League were
armed with at least one harquebus, an early form of rifle, and had been trained
extensively in their use. While a harquebus’ rate of fire was low (a mere 3
bullets per minute) and they were difficult to aim, they were extraordinarily
powerful. The half-ounce lead ball shot from its barrel could shear through
wood, metal and flesh within 200 yards. [19] The
Turks, on the other hand, used mostly bows. While there were some Ottomans who
used harquebus, most of them chose to shy away from technological advancement,
“due to a misguided sense of honour and military conservatism.”[20]
Turks chose to respect the customs of their Mameluke counterparts (Muslim
slave-warriors of the Middle East, renowned for their cavalry expertise), who
rigidly believed that any weapon which could not be used from the back of a
horse was uncivilized and morally questionable. This belief directed them look
upon harquebus with scorn, despite their obvious advantage over wooden bows.[21] Paruta
notes that, “…the conditions of the Weapons was of no small consideration: our
men fought armed, against unarmed enemies; and whereas the Turks did use their
Bows and Arrows most, wherewith our men, though wounded, were yet able to
fight, all our Musket shot was mortall”.[22]
Indeed, these guns served a vitally deadly role in the Christian’s victory at
Lepanto.
The Christian harquebuses were made even more
effective by the light armor worn by the Turks. The Ottomans had been fighting
at sea for decades, and knew that it was far safer to wear light armor into a
naval battle than it was to risk drowning under the weight of heavy steel.
However, in this case, experience was their undoing. While mail was effective
against arrows and some bladed weapons, a harquebus’ bullet tore through it like
it was cloth. Furthermore, the Ottoman’s poisoned tipped arrows were, for the
most part, ineffective against the heavy plate armor worn by most Christians. The
thick steel could repel any arrow, spear or sword. Paruta’s narrative supports
this: “wherein our Souldiers being sheltered, by our waste cloathes, fought the
more boldly, and more secure”.[23]
Although there were gaps in the armor for joints, to hit one of these joints
with an arrow was extremely difficult. It was even more difficult to achieve from
the deck of a swaying ship, while under constant harquebus fire, with the roar
of cannon and the screams of the dying all around. The Christians’ armor gave
them an absolute advantage against Turkish weaponry. [24]
Finally in battle position, the
Ottoman forces began to advance towards the Christian lines. As they
scanned their opponents, their eyes fell on the four massive ships at the front
of the Christian force. Most of the Turkish captains believed them to be
merchant vessels that had been caught between the two massive navies. In fact,
these were the Venetian galleasses, positioned at the head of the Christian fleet.
Two of the six galleasses had drifted out of position at the start of the
battle, and with such little maneuverability, it was impossible for them to
reenter the Christian lines As the Ottomans advanced, some of their captains
steered intentionally towards the galleasses while others aimed for the
Christian fleet that waited beyond. When they were within range, the galleasses
opened fire; The devastation was unimaginable. Victor Hanson writes that, “As
many as 10,000 Turkish seamen were thrown into the sea when their galleys were
obliterated in thirty minutes of firing from just four European ships.” [25] The galleasses, by themselves, were
responsible for a third of the Muslim casualties at Lepanto.[26]
However, some of the Turkish
galleys, led by Ali Pasha’s flagship Sultana,
survived the bombardment and sped towards the Christian lines. The Ottoman and
Christian vessels soon became entangled; their decks grinding against each
other as they jockeyed for position. The deck of the Sultana, which was now locked together
with Don Juan’s flagship La Reale,
was the main battlefield for the two forces’ centers. Ships docked with the two massive flagships almost by the minute,
spilling more and more troops into the chaotic battle. In the fray, Christian
harquebus fire tore through Ottoman soldiers, but the desperate Ottomans’
arrows failed to consistently pierce the Christian’s thick plate armor.
Furthermore, because of the ease with which they could board the Sultana, the Christians soon overwhelmed
its deck. Finally, a Christian bullet lodged itself in Ali Pasha’s skull, and
the Ottoman admiral fell to the deck, dead. When his head was mounted on the
railing of his own ship, his soldiers fled back to their ships. The center had
been won.
At the same time, commander
Agostino Barbarigo’s sixty-three galleys on the Christian left had engaged the
Ottomans. There, the Turks had advanced
past his galleasses and were moving
towards his lines at full speed. Barbarigo, in a brilliant tactical decision,
ordered his ships to back water so that the islands of Curzolaris effectively
protected his left flank. The Turks were forced to engage the League head to
head, and the Christians’ cannon and harquebus made short work of the enemy.[27]
On the League’s right flank,
however, things went rather differently.
There, commander Giovanni Andrea Doria had moved his vessels away from
the Christian line. While Doria’s motives are still unknown, many Christian
commanders asserted that Doria was attempting to protect his own galleys, at
the expense of the Christian flank. Whatever his motives, Doria’s move opened a
massive hole in the Christian lines. Within minutes, Ottoman ships poured
through the gap, and began attacking the Christian center from behind. Their
cannon fired unmercifully, tearing through Christian ship and soldier alike.
With panic grasping desperately at their hearts, and the enemy on two fronts,
the Christian center began to waver. This could have been the end of the Holy
League’s gamble. However, the League’s reserve, led by Juan de Cardona and
Alvarode Bazan, came to Don Juan’s rescue. Without hesitation, they crashed
headlong into the Muslim boats, sinking or commandeering every one they encountered.
Their attack was so ferocious that the remaining Turks were forced into full
retreat. Only 30 Ottoman ships survived the battle[28]
The next morning, over 40,000
corpses floated in the waters at Lepanto. Among them there were 30,000 Ottoman
soldiers, 34 Turkish admirals and over 100 Muslim commanders. Almost an entire generation
of Janissaries, the Ottomans elite and versatile fighting force, died at
Lepanto; Janissaries were trained from childhood and it would be a decade until
the next group was ready for combat. [29] The
Janissaries had perished aboard the more than 300 Ottoman vessels that had sunk
or been captured by the Holy League at Lepanto. The Christians had lost fewer
than 20 ships.[30]
While the entirety of the Ottoman
fleet was either captured or destroyed at Lepanto, within 3 years the Sultan
had rebuilt his navy. In 1574, he used it to retake the territory of Tunis,
which had been captured by Charles V in 1535. Because of this fact, many
historians argue that Lepanto was, in the grand scheme, historically
insignificant. However, other than Tunis, Ottoman military activity on the waves
of the Mediterranean virtually ceased after Lepanto. The threat of a united Christian naval force
was too great for the Turks to risk anything more than a minor offensive; another
attempt at Mediterranean domination would not be made. In the years after Tunis,
with no future in store, the Ottoman “…fleet simply disintegrated in port.” [31] Historian
Andrew Hess notes that the Christian victory at Lepanto, “…acted to establish a
limit against the further advance of the Turk in the Mediterranean, ended the
fear of Turkish invincibility and marked the beginning of Ottoman naval
decline.”[32]
Similarly, Victor Hanson writes, “Once the Ottomans were stopped at Lepanto,
the continued long-term autonomy of the western Mediterranean would never again
be in doubt.”[33]
Lepanto clearly marked the end of the Ottoman expansion into the Mediterranean,
and ensured Christian dominance of the sea.
This safety in the Mediterranean
was a huge boon to Christian economies all over Europe. After Lepanto, vital
western Mediterranean trade lines were once again safe for Christian vessels to
navigate. This security inspired European captains to reestablish abandoned
trade ties, and the stifled European economy began to expand. Additionally, the
members of the Holy League gained huge amounts of booty at Lepanto. The Ottoman
prisoners from Lepanto were enslaved and sold, and their galleys were either
sold or used to reinforce Christian navies. High-ranking Ottoman commanders,
such as Ali Pasha, had also kept their personal wealth on board their ships and
their vast fortunes were taken by the Christians. The amount of wealth gained
from their victory was staggering. [34]
Furthermore, the security of the
Mediterranean eliminated the possibility of Ottoman attacks on the Atlantic
trade lines to the New World. It is quite possible that with a Turkish victory
at Lepanto, the Ottomans would have continued to advance throughout the
Mediterranean, giving them new ports to harbor their war galleys. From these
ports, Ottoman raids could have hindered trade to the American colonies, and
thus affected their viability or ended their development. Victor Hanson states,
“Lepanto ensured that the growing Atlantic trade with the Americas would
continue…” and that it “ cemented their hold on New World and Asiatic colonies
and trading routes…”[35] Because
of this trade, the Spanish developments in the Americas were able to flourish
and expand.
Aside from these other benefits, however,
the most important consequence of the Christian victory at Lepanto was the
realization that together, the Christians could repel even the most powerful of
foes. Although Europeans had banded together in warfare before, Lepanto was the
first occasion where a completely integrated European force had preserved
Christian states from a foreign belligerent. Fernand Braudel comments that Don
Juan was “… able to take a miscellany of naval forces and turn it into a united
fleet… At a stroke, the galleys of the fleet became identical and
interchangeable…”[36] Spanish
soldiers stood shoulder to shoulder with Tuscans against the fury of the
Ottoman Empire. Papal harquebusers loaded their guns under the flags of their
Venetian comrades, while Genoans bellowed orders from the deck. Their unity in the
battle was such that they fought with an almost zealous fury in defense of
their religion, every man encouraged by his comrades next to him. According to
Paruta, when Don Juan raised the flag of battle on October 7th, “…all cry’d out
with great joy, Victory, victory…” [37] It
was not only the Spanish who raised this cry. It was not just the Venetians or
the Tuscans who felt adrenaline pour through their bodies at the sight of the
battle signal. The complete integration and unity of Europeans from almost
every corner of Christendom in order to protect European interests
was something that had never been seen, and would not be seen again for nearly
400 years.
Clearly, however, the members of
the Holy League did not completely comprehend the value of coalition. After
Lepanto, their League completely disintegrated as a result of childish
bickering. Although the Holy League had served its purpose well, after Lepanto it
had a perfect opportunity to retake Constantinople from the Ottomans. The Turks
had virtually no navy, very little army, and were not expecting a full-scale
invasion of their capital. The Holy League’s inability to maintain their
coalition after Lepanto robbed the world of many years of peace, and likely
hundreds of thousands of lives. A mere 20 years later, Christendom began 100
years of intermittent land-based warfare with the Turks. However, the Ottomans would never again make
an attempt on the Mediterranean Sea. In
that regard, the tide had finally turned. The Christian nations remained,
victorious.
[1] Timothy Shutt, “Lepanto”
(Lecture at Kenyon College, Gambier, OH, 2007). Pg. 1
[2] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 7-8
[3] Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean vol. 1 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), pg.
278
[4] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 157-158
[5] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg.235
[6] Paolo Paruta, A History of Venice [book on-line] (Ann
Arbor, MI: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 28 April, 2010); pg. 335
[7] Ibid. pg. 336
[8] Ibid.
[9] Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea (New York: Random
House Inc., 2008), pg. 285
[10] Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean vol. 2 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), pg. 1101
[11] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg. 258
[12] Paolo Paruta, A History of Venice [book on-line] (Ann
Arbor, MI: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 28 April, 2010); pg. 357
[13] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random House
Inc., 2001), pg. 246
[14] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 180-183
[15] Paolo Paruta, A History of Venice [book on-line] (Ann
Arbor, MI: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 28 April, 2010); pg. 359
[16] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 192
[17] Ibid.
[18] Fleuri Preuost, Letters Sent from Venice Anno. 1571
[book on-line]. (Ann Arbor, Mi: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 1
May, 2010); pg. 3
[19] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 214
[20] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg. 215
[21] Ibid.
[22] Paolo Paruta, A History of Venice [book on-line] (Ann
Arbor, MI: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 28 April, 2010); pg. 359
[23] Ibid.
[24] Niccolo Capponi, Victory of the West (United States: Da
Capo Press, 2007), pg. 215
[25] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg. 233-239
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] John Keegan, The Book of War (United States: Penguin
Putnam Inc., 1999), pg. 74
[30] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg. 268
[31] Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean vol. 1 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), pg.1088
[32]Andrew C. Hess, “The Battle
of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History.” Past and Present, no. 57 (1972); pg. 55
[33] Victor Hanson, Carnage and Culture (New York: Random
House Inc., 2001), pg. 268
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean vol.2 (New York:
Harper and Row, 1966), pg. 1101
[37] Paolo Paruta, A History of Venice [book on-line] (Ann
Arbor, MI: Early English Books online, 1999, accessed 28 April, 2010); pg. 257
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