235 years ago, our country won its independence from an enormous and powerful empire. The road to such a victory was long and hard-fought: farmers, potters, bartenders went to war with one of the most impressive armies to ever be assembled- and triumphed. Even for career military, their tactics and structure were innovative and competitive. Ultimately, the combination of both regular and irregular tactics was too much for the conventional British armed forces to handle. The use of Geurilla and maneuver warfare by various Revolutionary leaders brought about the defeat of a great leader and a genius career officer, Charles Cornwallis. His defeat at Yorktown in 1781 marked the end of the Revolutionary War and the birth of the United States. But who was Cornwallis? And how was he defeated?
In 1779, Cornwallis was
ordered to assist Sir Henry Clinton in a second attempt to conquer the southern
colonies.[6]
The two Generals sailed from New York on 26 December 1789, and arrived at
Charlestown on 1 April 1780. Although Revolutionary forces controlled the city,
they surrendered after a month of siege.[7] But,
on 5 June, Clinton heard that Washington was planning an attack on New York,
and sailed for the city.[8] Cornwallis
assumed administrative control of Charlestown and command of the 3000 troops
chosen for the southern campaign. Clinton did not want his subordinate to lead
an attack into North Carolina without him there. While the two generals were
friends for some of the war, they grew apart due to personal and professional
clashes in the later years of service together.[9] In
1780, Clinton wanted to assert himself over Cornwallis, and was only happy
leading the campaign himself. Nevertheless, Cornwallis drew up plans for an
attack on North Carolina in early September. He believed that a large group of
loyalists in North Carolina would support his army.[10]
He also believed that their support would give the British an advantage over
rebel forces.
In a letter to Clinton on
14 July, Cornwallis requested that Clinton “see the absolute necessity of a
diversion in the Chesapeake, and that it must be done early.”[11]
Cornwallis believed that if Clinton complied, two things would happen. First, Clinton’s
attack on the Chesapeake would draw Continental forces in North Carolina and
Virginia north to attack Clinton in South-Eastern Virginia. Cornwallis’ forces would
have pushed through North Carolina with ease, and the British would have
trapped the rebel forces between two British armies.[12] Within
a year, a Continental Army in the South probably would be defeated. The plan
was brilliant. But, Clinton did not cooperate, costing Britain the war.
Before Clinton received his
plans, Cornwallis heard of a small attack on Lord Rawdon’s forces in Camden,
South Carolina. It seemed this attack was merely a preliminary attack for a
much larger offensive. Continental forces under General Horatio Gates marshaled
in southern North Carolina.[13]
Cornwallis did not have time to wait for Clinton’s consent. He pushed north to
Camden with the bulk of his force, and arrived on the 13 August. Two days later,
the British engaged Gates a few miles north of Camden at Rugeley Mills.[14]
Cornwallis’ Army defeated Gates, killed 1000 rebels, and took 800 prisoners.[15]
Cornwallis advanced to
Charlotte, North Carolina. Here, he recruited loyalist militia. He ordered
Major Patrick Ferguson, a Scottish officer in his Army to contact local
settlements to recruit. Ferguson was successful and convinced over 1000
colonists to fight for Cornwallis.[16] However,
on 7 October 1780, rebel militia slaughtered Ferguson and his loyalist forces
at the Battle of King’s Mountain. The rebels killed almost all 1000 of the
loyalists.[17]
According to legend, the rebels fired on the crowd of loyalists even after they
had raised a white flag to surrender.[18]
The loss was devastating.
The success and savagery of the rebel forces ensured that no other loyalists joined
Cornwallis’ cause. Cornwallis found himself in a hostile environment with
enemies all around. Sickness spread through his army. Cornwallis himself came
down with a dangerous bout of flu.[19] Shortly
thereafter, he retreated to Winnsboro, South Carolina, where his army spent
three months recuperating. Meanwhile, General Nathaniel Greene rebuilt the
Continental Army and marched into North Carolina.[20]
Upon arriving at
Winnsboro, Cornwallis sent a letter to Clinton. “In the fullest confidence that
this event was to take place, Lord Cornwallis ventured to press your Excellency
for co-operation in the Chesapeak, hoping that the assistance of the North
Carolinians might eventually furnish a force for yet further efforts. Not a
single man, however, attempted to improve the favorable moment, or obeyed that
summons for which they had before been so impatient.”[21]
He was right to be angry. Clinton failed to support Cornwallis’ offensive, causing
failure. Over the course of his campaign, Cornwallis begged for Clinton’s assistance
numerous times. Clinton’s first mention of any action to support Cornwallis
appeared in a letter written to British war council member Lord George Germain,
dated November 10, 1780. Clinton wrote, “until I am certain that Earl
Cornwallis sees the propriety of establishing a post on Elizabeth River… I do
not of course think of adding to the corps already under his orders. However,
should that post be occupied, I shall probably send all the troops that can
possibly be spared from this army…”[22] In
a letter to Cornwallis, Clinton claimed that he had not assisted Cornwallis
because he was using all of his forces in the defense of New York City, and
that he, “had no other plans in view than to draw for the defence of this post,
and operations in its neighbourhood.”[23] After
the war, Clinton admitted that he had over 24,000 troops to defend the city.[24]
Washington only commanded
20,000 encamped in Pennsylvania. The likelihood of Washington attacking New
York City was slim. Early in the war, Washington had learned of the
difficulties of defending New York. Even if Washington seized the city, he could
not hold it. The British fleet, anchored off the coast of New York City, was
larger than the French fleet. Clinton’s defense of the city was unnecessary.
Clinton could have allowed a few thousand troops to attack the Chesapeake.
Cornwallis’ forces won two major battles against numerically superior
Continental forces with under 3000 troops. An attack on the Chesapeake with
4000 soldiers would have accomplished Cornwallis’ goals in the south. Instead, Clinton’s
delay spelled Cornwallis’ 1780 defeat. His inaction left Cornwallis vulnerable
after the Battle of King’s Mountain: strong reinforcements in the Chesapeake
would have given Cornwallis the support he needed to continue his offensive. He
would not have stopped at Charlotte, NC, and would have pushed north to meet
Clinton. Delay allowed the Continental Army to retreat and resupply. Clinton’s
inaction halted Cornwallis’ first campaign.
Cornwallis’s second
campaign into North Carolina began in early 1781. On 18 January, he marched from
Charlestown into North Carolina. After two months of marching, camping and
skirmishing with Continental forces, Cornwallis finally met Greene at Guilford,
NC on 15 March.[25]
While Cornwallis won the bloody battle, he suffered astronomical casualties. Over
400 men had been wounded, and almost a hundred killed.[26]
His army numbered only 1000 combat-ready soldiers. The battle forced Cornwallis
to abandon his attack on the Continental Army, and to retire to the coastal
city of Wilmington, NC.[27]
On 23 April, while
encamped outside Wilmington, Cornwallis heard word of an attack on the
Chesapeake.[28]
Clinton had finally mustered 5000 soldiers for an attack. Clinton dispatched Major-General Phillips, a
commander under Clinton and a personal friend to both Clinton and Cornwallis,
to seize a port in Virginia.[29]
But, Clinton was too late. The moment had been lost. Cornwallis’ army was a
shadow of what is was when he left Charlestown. Even so, Cornwallis readied his
troops and marched to meet Phillips, who died of disease on 13 May.[30] A
week later, Cornwallis arrived in Petersburgh to find his friend dead and
buried. Cornwallis assumed command of Phillips’ forces and read the
correspondence between Phillips and Clinton. Clinton had ordered Phillips to
seize either Yorktown or Old Point Comfort and to prepare it for the arrival of
a large fleet, carrying 2500 men. [31] The fleet would arrive by September.[32]
Cornwallis visited
Yorktown to examine its fortifications on 29 June. After his assessment, he wrote
to Clinton, “Upon viewing York, I was clearly of opinion that it far exceeds
our power, consistent with your plans, to make safe defensive posts there and
at Gloucester, both of which would be necessary for the protection of shipping.”[33]
Clinton retorted angrily, “I confess, I could not conceive you would require above
four thousand, in a station wherein General Arnold had represented to me… that
two thousand men would be amply sufficient”[34] Clinton
ordered Cornwallis to look for a defensive location at Old Point Comfort. Scrutiny
of the site found it also indefensible and Cornwallis reluctantly retreated to
York.[35]
His investigation wasted time needed to build defenses at York. The Americans, aware
of Cornwallis’s vulnerability, marched south towards York on 19 August.
Washington came from Pennsylvania and Lafayette from Mount Vernon, Virginia.[36] Clinton
ordered Cornwallis to secure York.[37]
This proved a huge mistake.
Cornwallis was correct. York could not be easily defended. The city straddled
the York river, making its defense twice as difficult. Should the Americans
attack both sides of the city, the York River provided the only means of
escape. Cornwallis had no ships large enough to transport all of his forces.
Clinton had bet Cornwallis’ entire Army on the small British fleet scheduled to
arrive in September.[38]
On 20 August, with
Continental forces closing in, Cornwallis entreated Clinton to send a force
large enough to support his actions in the Chesapeake. Cornwallis argued that
the British could win a decisive battle against the Continentals, bringing Virginia
to its knees.[39]
Before Clinton received Cornwallis’ letter, he was informed that Washington planned
to attack New York with all his strength.[40] Clinton
solidified his defenses and prepared for Washington’s attack. Instead, Washington
marched directly to York.[41] To
make matters worse, on 8 September Cornwallis learned that a large French fleet,
commanded by Comte de Grasse, had contacted Washington and was sailing directly
for the Chesapeake Bay. Cornwallis sent word to Clinton.[42] It
was too late. De Grasse’s ships inflicted terrible losses on the British fleet sailing
from Rhode Island three days earlier, on 5 September. The British ships fled
north towards New York.[43] Cornwallis
knew nothing of this engagement.
By then, Washington was in
Virginia, and Lafayette was at Williamsburgh. Cornwallis had not completed York’s
fortifications, and had provisions for only six weeks of siege.[44] Clinton’s
reinforcements never arrived. On 16 September, the French fleet appeared and
blocked the mouth of the York river, cutting off Cornwallis’s last chance of
escape.[45] On
September 24th, Clinton finally mobilized his forces. 5000 men and
30 ships sailed for the Chesapeake.[46]
Clinton’s delay cost the British dearly. Washington arrived at York with 20,000
men on October 11th.[47]
Washington fired over forty guns on the city, crumbling its defenses. In two
days of cannon bombardment, Cornwallis lost his defenses and 160 men. Washington
stood only 300 feet from the city.[48]
By the 15th, Cornwallis gave up hope. Continental forces charged his
fortifications and engaged the British in close and bloody combat. A letter to
Clinton recommended that the British fleet stay away from York. No force could save
Cornwallis.[49]
Out of ammunition, Cornwallis surrendered on the 17th. He lost 300
men. Clinton arrived on the 24th; 5 days late.[50]
Cornwallis’s defeat embarrassed
the British, and his surrender at York ended British rule in the colonies. Despite
the outcome, Cornwallis had made intelligent choices. His original plan for a
campaign into the Carolinas and Virginia was sound. Had it gone as planned, he
would have conquered the southern elements of the Continental Army, and subdued
the Southern colonies. Clinton’s wastes, not Cornwallis’s offensive, led to
British defeat at Yorktown.
Throughout the Southern
Campaign, Clinton’s aid would have changed the outcome of York. Clinton could
have stepped in and assisted Cornwallis. Instead, Clinton’s inaction led to a
chain of events that brought British defeat. Cornwallis’ did not advance past
Charlotte, NC because of Clinton’s inaction. This led to King’s Mountain in
October 1780. The battle shattered Cornwallis’s confidence, which could have
been revived with a decisive move from Clinton. Instead, Cornwallis moved back
into South Carolina and gave rebel and Continental forces time to resupply and
reinforce. The disaster at Guilford Court House cost him over 500 casualties and
forced him to flee to the coast. Clinton ordered Cornwallis to investigate Old Point
Comfort, a move that wasted vital time to prepare the defenses at York. The
order trapped Cornwallis in an indefensible, and inescapable location. Washington
contacted the French fleet under de Grasse and advanced to York. Clinton’s
failure to cooperate cost Britain the colonies.
But Clinton shared his
responsibility for the British failure with the Americans. Rebel militiamen
deserve credit for crushing the loyalists at King’s Mountain, Nathaniel
Greene’s Army blocked Cornwallis’ aggressive campaign, the French fleet destroyed
the British fleet, and Washington defeated Cornwallis at York. Clinton’s
failures were matched by American successes. The British defeat at Yorktown
dramatically underlined the incredible tenacity of Revolutionary forces, and
the difficulty that the British faced in their effort to retain control of the
13 colonies following the Battles of Lexington and Concord.
[1] Franklin and Mary Wickwire,
Cornwallis: The American Adventure
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), 8.
[2] Ibid., 20.
[3] Ibid., 28.
[4] Ibid., 81.
[5] Ibid., 92.
[6] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, ed. by Charles
Ross (London: J. Murray, 1859) http://0-galenet.galegroup.com.dewey2.library.denison.edu/servlet/Sabin?dd=0&locID=kenyon&d1=SABCP04563001&srchtp=a&c=1&an=SABCP04563001&d2=2&docNum=CY3804991292&h2=1&af=RN&d6=2&ste=10&stp=Author&d4=0.33&dc=tiPG&d5=d6&ae=CY104991291
[accessed October 2011], 43.
[7] Edited by John Rhodehamel, The American Revolution (New York:
Penguin Putnam, 2001,) 563.
[8] Wickwire, 132.
[9] Ibid.,121.
[10] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 43
[11] Ibid., 55.
[12] Demonstrated in Map #1
[13] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 55.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Wickwire, 164.
[16] Ibid., 208.
[17] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 59
[18] Wickwire, 215.
[19] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 62.
[20] Ibid, 70.
[21] Ibid., 62.
[22] Ibid., 66.
[23] Sir Henry Clinton and Lord
Charles Cornwallis, Correspondence
Between His Excellency General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B. and Lieutenant General
Earl Cornwallis (New York: s.n., 1781.) http://0-infoweb.
newsbank.com.dewey2. library. denison.edu/iw-search/we/Evans/?p_product=EAIX&p_theme=eai&p_nbid=
W60P59WOMTMxODg4MDgzOS45MzE2MjM6MToxNToxNDAuMTQxLjEzMC4xMTY&p_action=doc&p_queryname=1&p_docref=v2:0F2B1FCB879B099B@EAIX-0F2F8285F3C36B48@43953-101DAA4338770460@56&f_mode=citation
[accessed October 2011], 7.
[24] Sir Henry Clinton, The Narrative of Lieutenant-General Sir
Henry Clinton (London: John Debrett, 1785.)
http://0-find.galegroup.com.dewey2.library.denison.edu/
ecco/infomark.do?type=search&tabID=T001&queryId=Locale %28en%2C%
2C%29%3AFQE%3D%28BN%2CNone%2C7%29T102146%24&sort=Author&searchType=AdvancedSearchForm&version=1.0&userGroupName=kenyon&prodId=ECCO
[accessed October 2011], 11.
[25] Wickwire, 308
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid., 311.
[28] Iibd., 318.
[29] Charles Cornwallis, An Answer to that Part of the Narrative of
Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton, K.B.
during the Campaign in North-America (London: J. Debrett, 1783.) http://0
galenet.galegroup.com.dewey2.library.denison.edu /servlet
/Sabin?dd=0&af=RN&locID=kenyon&srchtp=a&c=1&ste=11&stp=Author&dc=flc&d4=0.33&docNum=CY101796885&ae=CY101796885&tiPG=1&an=SABCP00976800
[accessed October 2011], 20.
[30] Ibid.
[31] Memoirs of Nine Illustrious Living Characters (Dublin: Company of
Booksellers, 1799.) http://0-find.galegroup.com.dewey2.library.denison.edu/ecco/infomark
.do?&contentSet=ECCOArticles&type=multipage&tabID=T001&prodId=ECCO&docId=CW100832714&source=gale&userGroupName=kenyon&version=1.0&docLevel=FASCIMILE
[accessed October 2011], 53.
[32] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 98.
[33] Ibid., 103.
[34] Sir Henry Clinton and Lord
Charles Cornwallis, 5.
[35] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 109.
[36] Wickwire, 357.
[37] Sir Henry Clinton and Lord
Charles Cornwallis, 6.
[38] Wickwire, 356.
[39] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 113-115.
[40] Sir Henry Clinton and Lord
Charles Cornwallis, 38.
[41]
Davis, Burke, Yorktown: The Winning of American
Independence (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 34.
[42] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 117.
[43] James Grant, British Battles on Land and Sea (London:
Cassell, Petter, & Galpin, 1859), 174.
[44] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 118.
[45] Burke, 107.
[46] Sir Henry Clinton, The Narrative, 17.
[47] Correspondence of Charles, first Marquis Cornwallis, 122.
[48] Ibid., 124.
[49] Sir Henry Clinton and Lord
Charles Cornwallis, 61.
[50] Wickwire, 387.
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